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Contesting Austerity: The Potential and 
Pitfalls of Socioeconomic Rights Discourse 
JOE WILLS AND BEN TC WARWICK 
 
This article argues that, while socioeconomic rights have the 
potential to contribute to the contestation of austerity measures and the 
reimagining of a “postneoliberal” order, there are a number of features of 
socioeconomic rights as currently constructed under international law 
that limit these possibilities. We identify these limitations as falling into 
two categories: “contingent” and “structural.” Contingent limitations are 
shortcomings in the current constitution of socioeconomic rights law that 
undermine its effectiveness for challenging austerity measures. By 
contrast, the structural limitations of socioeconomic rights law are those 
that pertain to the more basic presuppositions and axioms that provide 
the foundations for legal rights discourse. We address these limitations 
and conclude by arguing that it is possible to harness the strengths of 
socioeconomic rights discourse while mitigating its shortcomings. A key 
element in moving beyond these shortcomings is the development of an 
understanding of such rights as just one component in a portfolio of 
counterhegemonic discourses that can be mobilized to challenge 
neoliberalism and austerity. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the turn of the century Perry Anderson described neoliberalism 
as “the most successful ideology in world history.”1 Since those words 
were written, neoliberalism has undergone a series of crises, and 
following the 2008 financial meltdown there has been an unprecedented 
public debate concerning the relevance, credibility, and durability of 
neoliberalism as an economic, political, and social order.2 The financial 
crash, widely attributed to the failure of governments to effectively 
                                                                                                     
 Lecturer in Law, University of Leicester. 
 Graduate Teaching Assistant, Durham University. 
 1. Perry Anderson, Renewals, 1 NEW LEFT REV. 1, 13 (2000). 
 2. See Stephen Gill, Introduction: Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, 
in GLOBAL CRISES AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL LEADERSHIP 1, 4–8 (Stephen Gill ed., 2012). 
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regulate the financial sector, has undoubtedly dealt a heavy blow to the 
free market credo that is integral to neoliberalism’s ideological self-
representation.3 Many mainstream commentators have joined radical 
opponents of neoliberalism in asserting the unsustainability of the 
current economic order.4 Indeed, the impact of the crisis even led the 
associate editor and chief economics commentator at the London 
Financial Times to declare that “[t]he world of the past three decades 
has gone.”5 
Despite the challenge seemingly posed to the legitimacy of 
neoliberalism by the current economic crisis, assumptions that 
neoliberalism is dead or that we have now moved to a “postneoliberal 
world” are premature.6 Indeed, it is clear that the response to economic 
recession by many national governments and global governance 
organizations has been to impose austerity, cut social protection, and 
further privatize and commodify pensions, health care, and education.7 
In other words, the structural and discursive power of neoliberalism has 
enabled the economic recession to be “used by many Western 
governments as a means of further entrenching the neoliberal model.”8 
The International Monitory Fund (IMF), European Commission, and 
the European Central Bank’s joint promotion and enforcement of 
austerity and privatization in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and 
Ireland in response to the economic crisis in the Eurozone demonstrates 
the continued pervasiveness of neoliberal practice in global governance.9  
                                                                                                     
 3. See James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical 
Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563, 564 (2009). 
See generally WHAT CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Jeffrey Friedman ed., 2011). 
 4. See Gill, supra note 2, at 4. 
 5. Martin Wolf, Seeds of Its Own Destruction, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at 19. 
 6. See, e.g., COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM (2011); 
Manuel B. Aalbers, Neoliberalism is Dead . . . Long Live Neoliberalism!, 37 INT’L J. URB. & 
REG’L RES. 1083 (2013). 
 7. See Robin Blackburn, Crisis 2.0, 72 NEW LEFT REV. 33, 34 (2011). 
 8. Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey & Michael Rustin, Framing Statement: After 
Neoliberalism: Analysing the Present, in AFTER NEOLIBERALISM? THE KILBURN 
MANIFESTO 9, 10 (Stuart Hall et al. eds., 2015). 
 9. See William I. Robinson, The Global Capital Leviathan, 165 RADICAL PHIL. 2, 5 
(2011). For an account of how neoliberal austerity became the dominant paradigm in the 
post-2008 world, see generally PHILIP MIROWSKI, NEVER LET A SERIOUS CRISIS GO TO 
WASTE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM SURVIVED THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2013) (arguing that 
the pervasiveness of neoliberal thought serves to further evidence its ultimate veracity). 
For accounts of how neoliberalism became hegemonic, generally see Susan George, How 
To Win The War Of Ideas: Lessons from the Gramscian Right, DISSENT, Summer 1997, at 
47; PHILIP G. CERNY, Embedding Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a Hegemonic Paradigm, 
in RETHINKING WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL NEOPLURALISM 128 
(2010); David Miller, How Neoliberalism Got Where It Is: Elite Planning, Corporate 
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The neoliberal “solution” to the crisis of its own making is widely 
perceived as unjust and unsustainable.10 While the wealthy financial 
actors responsible for the crisis were saved by public funds, the massive 
public debt incurred in the wake of these bailouts is now being serviced 
through austerity cuts that have disproportionately fallen upon the 
already marginalized and exploited.11 The growing pressure to adopt 
these measures, ostensibly for reasons of fiscal consolidation, is 
undermining social protection, public health, and education programs 
on which the vulnerable, the poor, and working people depend.12  
There are innumerable critiques that could be deployed to challenge 
the current neoliberal wave of “austerity politics.”13 However, this paper 
will focus on the role that the discourse of socioeconomic rights might 
play in contesting the current social and economic impasse. For the 
purpose of this paper, socioeconomic rights are understood as the 
subcategory of human rights concerned with the material bases of 
human well-being.14 Their primary normative function is to secure a 
basic quality of life for individuals and communities through 
guaranteeing access to material goods and services such as food, water, 
shelter, education, health care, and housing. These rights find legal 
expression in a number of international instruments and national 
constitutions.15  
This article will argue that socioeconomic rights discourse contains 
a number of principles that can be used to interrogate the present 
neoliberal austerity drive, namely the principles of progressive 
realization, non-retrogression, maximum available resource 
mobilization, non-discrimination and equality, minimum core duties, 
and participation and accountability. These principles can serve as 
important counterframes to the dominant neoliberal fixation on 
competitiveness, efficiency, and economic rationality. 
However, while socioeconomic rights have the potential to 
contribute toward the reimagining of a “postneoliberal” order, there are 
                                                                                                     
Lobbying and the Release of the Free Market, in THE RISE AND FALL OF NEOLIBERALISM: 
THE COLLAPSE OF AN ECONOMIC ORDER? 23 (Kean Birch & Vlad Mykhnenko eds., 2010). 
 10. See generally DAVID STUCKLER & SANJAY BASU, THE BODY ECONOMIC: WHY 
AUSTERITY KILLS (2013). 
 11. See Jan Breman, Myth of the Global Safety Net, 59 NEW LEFT REV. 29, 29 (2009). 
 12. See U.N. DEPT. OF ECONOMIC & SOC. AFFAIRS, THE GLOBAL SOCIAL CRISIS: REPORT 
ON THE WORLD SOCIAL SITUATION, at 6, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/334, U.N. Sales No. E.10.IV.12 
(2011). 
 13. E.g., POLITICS IN THE AGE OF AUSTERITY (Armin Schäfer & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 
2013). 
 14. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (1992). 
 15. See infra Section I.b. 
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a number of features of socioeconomic rights as currently constructed 
under international law that limit these possibilities. We identify these 
limitations as falling into two categories: “contingent” and “structural.” 
We classify contingent limitations as shortcomings in socioeconomic 
rights law as it is currently constituted that undermine its effectiveness 
in challenging austerity measures. These shortcomings can be overcome 
through clarifying and extending existing principles within the 
normative architecture of international socioeconomic rights law. By 
contrast, the structural limitations of socioeconomic rights law are those 
that pertain to the more basic presuppositions and axioms that provide 
the foundations for legal rights discourse. Unlike contingent limitations, 
these structural limitations cannot be overcome simply by tweaking the 
extant framework. Instead, they require moving beyond, or 
supplementing, appeals to legal rights with more overtly political 
demands and programs.  
Part I of this paper will examine key philosophical and legal 
principles that underpin socioeconomic rights law which can provide a 
basis for contesting neoliberal austerity measures. Part II will focus on 
two contingent shortcomings of socioeconomic rights for these purposes. 
The first is the failure of existing socioeconomic rights standards to 
adequately address the responsibilities of transnational actors such as 
the IMF and World Bank, which have played a major role in promoting 
and maintaining austerity measures that have negatively impacted 
socioeconomic rights. The second limitation is the absence of clear 
standards with respect to the presumptive proscription of “retrogressive 
measures” in the context of austerity programs. This lack of clarity on 
the doctrine’s criteria limits the possibilities to deploy it against cuts to 
social protection systems. Part III will explore some of the structural 
limitations of legal rights discourse. These include the formal and 
abstract character of this discourse, well documented in critical legal 
literature, and the ways this undermines its capacity to address the 
systemic driving forces behind austerity and obscures, and to some 
extent naturalizes, the social systems and power structures that 
determine who will suffer and who will be shielded from harm. Finally, 
the paper will conclude by arguing that it is possible to harness the 
strengths of socioeconomic rights discourse while mitigating its 
shortcomings by understanding it as just one component of a portfolio of 
counterhegemonic discourses that can be mobilized to challenge 
neoliberalism and austerity.  
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I.  THE POTENTIAL OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS 
STANDARDS 
A.  Neoliberalism and Socioeconomic Rights: Foundational Tensions 
It is widely recognized in the human rights literature that 
neoliberalism as a doctrine is hostile to socioeconomic rights at a 
foundational level.16 Historically, neoliberals have rejected 
socioeconomic rights on two main grounds: one libertarian and one 
utilitarian. The libertarian argument is based upon a conception of 
“negative freedom” which holds that individuals are free when they are 
not subject to coercion by others.17 As socioeconomic rights seem to carry 
the guarantee that individuals have access to certain material goods 
and services—such as food, housing, and health care—neoliberals 
believe that, in the final analysis, they are premised on coercive acts, 
such as taxation or appropriation, and therefore undermine individual 
freedom.18 The most notable of the purported interferences is with the 
individual’s right to private property, which is one of the central rights 
of a free society for neoliberals.19 As Erich Weede of the Cato Institute, a 
libertarian think tank, puts it: “Since positive rights or entitlements 
need funding, the attempt to provide positive rights requires an 
infringement of negative rights, especially of the right to enjoy the fruits 
                                                                                                     
 16. E.g., Phillip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by 
Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815, 826–27 (2002); Marius 
Pieterse, Beyond the Welfare State: Globalisation of the Neo-Liberal Culture and the 
Constitutional Protection of Social and Economic Rights in South Africa, 14 
STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 3, 14 (2003); Paul O’Connell, On Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-
Liberal Globalisation and Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 483, 507 (2007); RAYMOND 
PLANT, THE NEO-LIBERAL STATE 116 (2010).  
 17. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 16–17 (1960). 
 18. See 2 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 2: THE MIRAGE OF 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 102–03 (1998 ed. 1976); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 
238 (2013 ed. 1974). Nozick is usually classified as a libertarian rather than a neo-liberal. 
Nevertheless, as Raymond Plant notes, Nozick’s theories have been influential in the 
development of neo-liberalism. See PLANT, supra note 16, at 96. 
 19. See HAYEK, supra note 17, at 140; MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO 
CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 67 (1990 ed. 1980); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS 
A GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY 59 (1993). Murray Rothbard goes so far as to argue that “not 
only are there no human rights which are not also property rights, but the former rights 
lose their absoluteness and clarity and become fuzzy and vulnerable when property rights 
are not used as the standard.” MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 113 (1982). 
See generally DAVID KELLEY, A LIFE OF ONE’S OWN: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE WELFARE 
STATE (1998) (critiquing assumptions behind the welfare state). 
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of one’s labor.”20 It follows for neoliberals that rights protection should 
be limited to traditional civil and political rights that only impose duties 
of forbearance (i.e., noninterference).21 
 The utilitarian objection to socioeconomic rights is based on the 
belief that such rights constitute an unacceptable interference with the 
“spontaneous order” of the free market.22 On the neoliberal account, 
markets are not only an intrinsic expression of freedom but also have 
instrumental value as vehicles for welfare maximization, information 
coordination and the guarantee of broader political freedom.23 Whereas 
the state is regarded as bureaucratic, unresponsive, and inefficient, 
markets are held to be flexible, responsive, and self-correcting.24 The 
superiority of the market stems from its ability to “spontaneously” 
coordinate the dispersed, separate, and partial knowledge of individuals 
through the price mechanism and the laws of supply and demand.25 
Markets are threatened by the interventions of central authorities that 
seek to achieve particular outcomes because such interventions distort 
their information-coordinating capacity.26 Socioeconomic rights are at 
least in part concerned with achieving particular outcomes—for 
example, assuring that individuals have access to affordable water—and 
therefore favor the distribution of resources according to normative 
criteria such as human dignity or need.27 To achieve this, a central 
authority would have to determine how and on what basis goods and 
                                                                                                     
 20. Erich Weede, Human Rights, Limited Government, and Capitalism, 28 CATO J. 35, 
47 (2008). 
 21. It should be noted that the neoliberal argument that social rights impose positive 
obligations, whereas civil and political rights only impose negative obligations, is based 
upon a false and oversimplified dichotomy that has been largely rejected in the human 
rights literature. See, e.g., SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE 
RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES 66–70 (2008); see also Aoife Nolan et al., The Justiciability of 
Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal 7 (N.Y.U. Cent. Hum. Rts. Glob. 
Justice, Working Paper No. 15, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434944. 
 22. See HAYEK, supra note 18, at 103, 107–32; Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive 
Rights, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 35, 35 (1993) (arguing against constitutionalized 
socioeconomic rights on the basis that they compel governments to interfere with free 
markets); Weede, supra note 20, at 40. 
 23. See HAYEK, supra note 17, at 120; FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 9–38; 
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7–21 (2002 ed. 1962). 
 24. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 9–69. 
 25. See id. at 13–24; HAYEK, supra note 18, at 120. 
 26. See HAYEK, supra note 18, at 128–29. 
 27. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone is entitled, “as a 
member of society,” to the realization of “the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.” Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
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services should be distributed. The effect of such interference would be 
to “distort” the information-coordinating role of markets.28  
Hence neoliberals argue for a strict separation of the political sphere 
of the state, which has the responsibility of upholding fundamental civil 
and political rights, and the economic sphere of the market, which 
should be left to its own mechanisms to determine social and economic 
entitlement.29 Particular levels of education, health care, social security, 
and so forth are not regarded as legal or moral entitlements, but rather 
as commodities to be acquired through the market.30 It follows from this 
that neoliberals tend to welcome the cuts to public services currently 
being undertaken on the basis that the reduction in state spending and 
the privatization of formerly public services create better conditions for 
individual freedom and economic efficiency.31 
Advocates of socioeconomic rights contest these arguments. First, 
they question why freedom is the sole criterion for rights on the 
neoliberal account. Freedom is undoubtedly an important human value, 
but it is not the only value: a state of physical and mental well-being, 
the ability to participate in democratic life, and substantive equality 
amongst citizens are also all important human values that can be 
promoted by rights. More fundamentally, however, advocates of 
socioeconomic rights question the very account of “freedom” advanced by 
neoliberals. They argue that “negative freedom,” freedom from coercion, 
is not an end in itself, but rather is valuable or instrumental in 
achieving a broader and more basic good: autonomy, “living a life 
shaped by ones [sic] aims and goals—the exercise of our capacity for 
agency.”32 Freedom on this account is not simply the absence of coercion 
but rather the ability to exercise genuine choice and act on those 
choices.33 This requires the removal of all sources of “unfreedom,” 
including poverty, social deprivation, and neglect of public facilities.34 
As Raymond Plant argues,  
                                                                                                     
 28. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 17; cf. HAYEK, supra note 17, at 75 
(arguing that services have "value only to particular people" and not a separate 
"determined and ascertainable 'value to society'").  
 29. See TONY EVANS, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 79–80 
(2nd ed. 2005). 
 30. See HAYEK, supra note 18, at 106 (“To establish enforceable rights to the benefits is 
not likely to produce them.”). 
 31. Austerity measures that threaten macroeconomic stability may however be subject 
to critique within the neoliberal/neoclassical paradigm. See Jonathan D. Ostry et al., When 
Should Public Debt Be Reduced? 2–7 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Note 15/10, 
2015) (warning against low-risk governments adopting needless austerity measures). 
 32. See Raymond Plant, Social and Economic Rights Revisited, 14 KINGS COLL. L.J. 1, 
16 (2003). 
 33. See FREDMAN, supra note 21, at 10–16. 
 34. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (4th prtg. 2000). 
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For the capacity for autonomy to exist there has to be a 
degree of physical integrity and health insofar as this is 
achievable and alterable by human agency; there has to 
be an appropriate level of education; and there has to be 
an appropriate level of security in terms of income and 
social security in that individuals will not develop the 
capacity for autonomy if the whole of each individual’s 
life is devoted to securing the basic means of 
subsistence.35  
As such, socioeconomic rights are regarded as freedom enhancing 
rather than freedom reducing.36  
Like the libertarian objection grounded in negative freedom, the 
utilitarian objection to socioeconomic rights has also been subject to 
critique. First, the empirical assertion that governmental intervention 
in the market reduces aggregate welfare through its “distorting” effect 
has been challenged.37 Indeed, it is widely agreed that it was 
government underregulation of the market that was the most 
immediate cause, not just of the present economic crisis, but also of 
previous ones, such as the 1929 Wall Street Crash or the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis.38 At a deeper level, advocates of human rights question 
the aggregative logic of utilitarian calculations in neoclassical 
economics. They argue that the fixation with maximizing the aggregate 
welfare of society loses sight of individuals as the principle locus of 
moral value.39 Advocates of socioeconomic rights are concerned not only 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Plant, supra note 32, at 17. 
 36. There are a number of other critiques that are outside the scope of this article. The 
first is that the neoliberal argument that social rights impose positive obligations, 
whereas civil and political rights only impose negative obligations, is based upon a false 
and oversimplified dichotomy. See FREDMAN, supra note 21, at 66–70. The other 
argument, advanced by Cohen, points out a fundamental contradiction in the neoliberal 
account: the neoliberal valorization of private property contradicts their defense of 
negative liberty, as property rights require restrictions on the negative liberty of others. 
(If X owns a field, she may exclude Y from walking across it, backed by the power of state 
coercion, thereby infringing Y’s negative liberty to be free of such coercion.) See G.A. 
COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM AND EQUALITY 38–67 (1995). 
 37. See, for example, the arguments of Ray Kiely, Neo Liberalism Revised? A Critical 
Account of World Bank Concepts of Good Governance and Market Friendly Intervention, 
22(1) CAPITAL & CLASS 63 (1998); Richard B. Freeman, Labor Market Institutions and 
Policies: Help or Hindrance to Economic Development?, 6 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 117–
144 (1992); RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY EQUALITY IS 
BETTER FOR EVERYONE 49-173 (2010)  
 38. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME REP., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999 2–4 (1999). 
 39. See Margot E. Salomon & Colin Arnott, Better Development Decision-Making: 
Applying International Human Rights Law to Neoclassical Economics, 32 NORDIC J. HUM. 
RTS. 44, 61 (2014). 
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with maximizing aggregate welfare but also with the distribution of 
welfare gains in ways that respect the inherent dignity of every 
individual. In particular, they are concerned that distributional 
patterns are not only non-discriminatory but also prioritarian, giving 
priority to interests of the most disadvantaged and marginalized 
members of society.40  
Having identified some of the core foundational differences between 
neoliberal and socioeconomic rights discourses, the next section will 
examine some of the principles that govern the international law of 
socioeconomic rights and consider their potential as important 
counterframes to the neoliberal logic that underpins the current 
austerity drive.  
B.  Socioeconomic Rights Under International Law  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
foundational constitution of international human rights law, contains 
civil and political protections as well as socioeconomic guarantees.41 The 
process of translating this declaration into binding international 
standards was a protracted affair significantly shaped by the 
geopolitical rivalries of the Cold War.42 The initial unity seen in the 
UDHR was fractured into two binding interstate treaties covering 
socioeconomic rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),43 and civil and political rights in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).44 Two 
separate United Nations (U.N.) committees—the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Human Rights 
Committee—monitor the implementation of each of these treaties, 
                                                                                                     
 40. See id. at 64; Audrey R. Chapman & Benjamin Carbonetti, Human Rights 
Protections for Vulnerable and Disadvantaged Groups: The Contributions of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 682, 683 (2011). 
 41. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 27; see also AM. L. INST., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 701, n.6 
(1987) (describing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the “accepted 
articulation of recognized rights”). 
 42. See Alicia Ely Yamin, The Right to Health Under International Law and Its 
Relevance to the United States, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1156, 1156 (2005); see also Office of 
the High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Frequently Asked Questions on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Fact Sheet No. 33), at 9 (2008). 
 43. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 44. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at http://www.ohchr.org/ 
en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. 
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reviewing states on a regular basis and providing guidance through 
“General Comments.”45 
Despite their historically subordinate status as the “poor cousins”46 
of their civil and political counterparts,47 socioeconomic rights have 
gained in prominence in the last three decades and have been 
incorporated in a number of international instruments,48 regional 
treaties,49 and national constitutions,50 all of which have helped to 
develop “an increasingly expansive” international socioeconomic rights 
jurisprudence.51 Despite past treatment of socioeconomic rights as mere 
nonbinding “aspirations” at best, or as lacking the intrinsic character of 
                                                                                                     
 45. The Human Rights Committee monitors the ICCPR and, since 1987, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has monitored the implementation of 
the ICESCR. See Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, First Session of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 747, 747–49 (1987). 
 46. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, 2003-4, H.L. 183, H.C. 
1188, ¶ 163 (U.K.); see also BEN SAUL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS 8 
(2014); Colm O’Cinneide, Bringing Socio-Economic Rights Back into the Mainstream of 
Human Rights: The Case-Law of the European Committee on Social Rights as an Example 
of Rigorous and Effective Rights Adjudication (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1543127. 
 47. See David Marcus, The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights Through 
Supranational Adjudication, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 54 (2006) (“Despite innumerable 
proclamations of indivisibility and equality, socioeconomic rights languish far behind their 
civil and political counterparts in the pantheon of human rights protection.”). 
 48. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 43; United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, arts. 24–28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 
2006); United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, arts. 23–31, 
UN Doc. A/Res/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989); United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, arts. 10–14, UN Doc. 
A/Res/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979). 
 49. E.g., Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 16, 1999, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69; African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights arts. 15–17, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
Rev. 5, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (enumerating the rights to work under satisfactory conditions, 
equal pay for equal work, the right to health, and the right to education); European Social 
Charter, arts. 1–3, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (outlining the foundation of the 
socioeconomic rights to work, to just conditions of work, and to safe and healthy working 
conditions). 
 50. See Malcolm Langford, The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory, 
in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008) (claiming that both constitutions and 
international law serve as instruments through which human rights and social values are 
vindicated) [hereinafter SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE]. 
 51. Philip Alston, Foreword to SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 50, at x. 
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rights at worst,52 today the status of socioeconomic rights is settled: they 
are bona fide legal rights that generate binding normative obligations 
under international law.53  
The socioeconomic rights framework applied in this article is based 
on the ICESCR. While this is not the only international socioeconomic 
rights instrument, it is the oldest, the most widely ratified, and the most 
wide-ranging instrument of its kind. The ICESCR contains a number of 
rights, including rights to work, to just and favorable conditions of 
employment, to form and join trade unions, to social security, to the 
protection of the family, to an adequate standard of living, to health-
related rights, to education, and to cultural rights.54 The generally 
applicable obligations of State Parties in relation to these rights are set 
out in Articles 2 and 3 of the ICESCR. Articles 2(2) and 3 require State 
Parties to ensure non-discrimination in relation to the enjoyment of the 
rights under the covenant.55 Article 2(1) stipulates that 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures.56  
While the requirements of this rather convoluted obligation were 
subject to considerable debate in the past, since 1990 the CESCR have 
                                                                                                     
 52. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 88 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 2001); CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 113 (1978) (arguing that 
socioeconomic rights are negative rights, the type of which honoring “is costly”); MAURICE 
CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 37–38 (Taplinger ed. 1973) (1973); Kenneth 
Minogue, The History of the Idea of Human Rights, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 3, 14 
(Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 1979); Maurice Cranston, Human Rights, Real and 
Supposed, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 43, 43 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1967); 
Aryeh Neier, Social and Economic Rights: A Critique, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 1 (2006) 
(suggesting the adjudication of socioeconomic rights disputes as “unmanageable through 
the judicial process”). 
 53. See The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex (reprinted 
in 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 122 (1987)); Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, ¶ 5, M.C.H.R. 97-124 (Mar. 4, 1997). 
 54. See ICESCR, supra note 43, at arts. 6–15. 
 55. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., The Right to Work, General Comment No. 
18, ¶33 U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb 6, 2006). 
 56. Id. at art. 2(1) (emphasis added). 
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issued “General Comments” and other statements to delineate the 
normative content of state obligations under the ICESCR.  
This section will briefly outline some of these obligations and 
discuss the ways in which they could be useful to challenge the 
dominance of austerity policies. 
1.  Progressive Realization and Non-retrogression 
The requirement of “progressive realization” set out in Article 2(1) of 
the ICESCR imposes an obligation on State Parties “to move as 
expeditiously and effectively” to ensuring the fulfilment of socioeconomic 
rights.57 The obligation to realize socioeconomic rights continues to 
apply, and is perhaps more pertinent, during times of economic 
contraction.58 As such, the primary obligation on states is to continue to 
progressively realize socioeconomic rights at a rate commensurate to the 
“maximum available resources” of the state.  
Where states cannot (or do not) comply with this obligation to 
progressively improve rights realization, a major “corollary” duty is 
engaged.59 This duty—to avoid enacting deliberately “retrogressive 
measures”—is said to derive from the obligation to progressively realize 
socioeconomic rights. The principle of non-retrogression establishes a 
strong presumption against State Parties deliberately adopting laws 
and policies that would jeopardize existing achievements in the 
realization of socioeconomic rights.60 The presumption against 
                                                                                                     
 57. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 3: The Nature of 
State Parties’ Obligations, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter CESCR, 
General Comment No. 3]. 
 58. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 4: The Right to 
Adequate Housing, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991); see also Comm. on Econ., 
Soc. & Cultural Rts., Globalization and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶¶ 436–61, 
U.N. Doc. E/1999/22–E/C.12/1998/26 (1998); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., 
General Comment 2: International Technical Assistance Measures, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
E/1990/23 (1990) [hereinafter CESCR, General Comment No. 2].  
 59. See Illari Aragon Noriega, Judicial Review of the Right to Health and Its 
Progressive Realisation: The Case of the Constitutional Court of Peru, 1 UCL J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 166, 172 (2012); Dianne Otto & David Wiseman, In Search of ‘Effective 
Remedies’: Applying the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
to Australia, 7 AUST. J. HUM. RTS. 5, 44 (2001); Craig M. Scott, Covenant 
Constitutionalism and the Canada Assistance Plan, 6 CONST. F. 79, 81 (1994). 
 60. See General Comments supra note 58; see also Econ. & Soc. Council, Substantive 
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: International Consultation “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
the Development Activities of International Institutions” Organized in Cooperation with 
the High Council for International Cooperation (France), ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/6 
(Mar. 12, 2001) (by Hamish Jenkins). 
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retrogressive measures has important salience in the context of 
austerity measures, which have involved cuts to social protection 
systems and other services based in socioeconomic rights that have 
adversely impacted people’s enjoyment of those rights.61 
Where deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the burden of 
proof is on a State Party to demonstrate that a number of conditions 
have been met. These conditions have varied throughout the previous 
two decades;62 however, the most recent guidance requires that a 
proposed policy change in response to financial crisis must meet a 
number of human rights requirements: first, it must be temporary, in 
the sense that it covers only the period of crisis; second, it must be 
necessary and proportionate, in the sense that the adoption of any other 
policy, or failure to act, would be more detrimental to economic, social, 
or cultural rights; third, the policy must not be discriminatory;63 fourth, 
the policy should identify the minimum core of rights and ensure the 
protection of this minimum at all times.64  
The dual aims of the progressive realization and non-retrogression 
obligations are to establish “clear obligations” while also being a 
“necessary flexibility device.”65 As such, the progressive realization 
obligation and especially the doctrine of non-retrogression provide an 
                                                                                                     
 61. E.g., Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, 
Rep. of the Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, ¶¶ 
44, 47, U.N. Doc A/HRC/17/34/Add.2, annex (May 17, 2011) (by Magdalena Sepúlveda 
Carmona). 
 62. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Comment No. 3, supra note 57; see also, 
e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social 
Security, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter CESCR, Comment No. 
19]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, 
¶ 19, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) [hereinafter CESCR, General Comment No. 15]; 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) [hereinafter CESCR, 
General Comment No. 14]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 
13: The Right to Education, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) [hereinafter CESCR, 
General Comment No. 13].  
 63. Discussed further at Part I.B.4. infra. 
 64. See Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Letter dated May 16, 
2012 from the Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights addressed to 
States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
U.N. Doc. CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW (May 16, 2012); see also, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & 
Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Report of Iceland, Adopted by the 
Committee at its Forty-Ninth Session, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ISL/CO/4 (Nov. 30, 2012); 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Spain, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/ESP/CO/5 (June 6, 2012) [hereinafter CESCR, Spain].  
 65. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 55. 
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“escape hatch” which allow states to reduce protection of socioeconomic 
rights in some circumstances.66  
2.  Maximum Available Resources 
Although attention to state expenditures has grown,67 in the context 
of state incomes, there has been a historical “hesitation” to dealing with 
taxation frameworks from a human rights perspective.68 Sepùlveda, 
grounding her analysis in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, notes that the 
obligation of governments to realize socioeconomic rights requires that 
they must mobilize resources within their country to their utmost 
availability.69 Available resources are not limited to financial resources, 
but may also include human and organizational resources.70 To that 
end, taxation constitutes a vital source of revenue in the context of 
utilizing maximum available resources.71 The design and structure of a 
taxation framework, as well as the State’s willingness and ability to 
implement and enforce it, is of vital importance in this respect.72  
One of the controversies in the current period of austerity is that, 
while governments justify reductions in social programs on the basis 
that they do not have the resources to finance them, large amounts of 
tax are often not collected due to weak enforcement, corruption, 
criminal tax evasion, and legal strategies of tax avoidance.73 Yet a 
landmark report by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty 
and Human Rights notes that the effective collection of tax is the most 
“straightforward” way of ensuring such rights, as it means that 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Scott Leckie, Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features 
of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 81, 94 (1998). 
 67. See Aoife Nolan, Not Fit for Purpose? Human Rights in Times of Financial and 
Economic Crisis, 4 EUR. HUM. RIGHTS LAW REV. 360–371 (2015) (noting the development 
of the CESCR’s approach to economic policy). 
 68. See Magdalena Sepúlveda, Taxation for Human Rights, 9 TAX JUST. FOCUS 3, 3 
(2014). 
 69. See M. MAGDALENA SEPÚLVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 313–19 (2003). 
 70. See Diane Elson et al., Public Finance, Maximum Available Resources and Human 
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC FINANCE: BUDGETS AND THE PROMOTION OF 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 13, 15 (Aoife Nolan et al. eds., 2013).  
 71. See RADHIKA BALAKRISHNAN ET AL., MAXIMUM AVAILABLE RESOURCES & HUMAN 
RIGHTS: ANALYTICAL REPORT 3 (2011); Sepúlveda, supra note 68, at 3. 
 72. SAUL ET AL., supra note 46, at 144. 
 73. See Wolfgang Obenland, Taxes and Human Rights, 8e INFO STEUERGERECHTIGKEIT 
3 (2013). 
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governments have sufficient resources for high-quality public services.74 
For these reasons, demands for “tax justice” are increasingly 
conceptualized as a human rights issue.75  
The pressures on state resources are intensified during a financial 
crisis.76 Yet the CESCR has made clear that a crisis or fiscal deficit does 
not absolve governments of their obligations to utilize their maximum 
available resources to realize socioeconomic rights. Quite the opposite: it 
requires that they take extra care in allocating their available resources 
to protect marginalized and vulnerable groups.77 
The presumed impermissibility of retrogressive measures is 
inseparably connected to the requirement that states use the maximum 
of their available resources to implement ICESCR rights. The CESCR 
has affirmed that, “even in times of severe resources constraints 
whether caused by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or by 
other factors the most vulnerable members of society can and indeed 
must be protected by the adoption of relatively low-cost targeted 
programmes.”78 Furthermore, if a state uses “resource constraints” as 
an explanation for a retrogressive measure, the CESCR will assess the 
situation considering, among other factors, the country’s level of 
development, the severity of the breach, whether the situation 
concerned the enjoyment of the minimum core of the rights, and 
whether the state had identified low-cost options or sought international 
assistance.79 
 
 
                                                                                                     
 74. See Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Hum. Rts., Rep. on Extreme Poverty 
and Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Council, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc A/HRC/26/28 (May 22, 2014) (by 
Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona).  
 75. See id. ¶¶ 36–42. See generally Ignacio Saiz, Resourcing Rights: Combating Tax 
Injustice from a Human Rights Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC FINANCE: 
BUDGETS AND THE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 70, at 77. 
 76. Additionally, many states started from a weak socio-economic position. Pillay and 
Wesson, in the context of South Africa, ask whether the country can be seen as having 
experienced, “[a] crisis prior to a crisis.” Anashri Pillay & Murray Wesson, Recession, 
Recovery and Service Delivery: Political and Judicial Responses to the Financial and 
Economic Crisis in South Africa, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 335, 336 (Aoife Nolan ed., 2014). 
 77. This is reflected in the work of the Committee. See Chairperson of the Comm. on 
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 64. See also David Bilchitz, Socio-Economic Rights, 
Economic Crisis, and Legal Doctrine, 12 INT'L. J. CONST. L. 710, 729–33 (2014). 
 78. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 55, ¶ 12. 
 79. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take 
Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” Under an Optional Protocol to the 
Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc E/C.12/2007/1 (May 10, 2007). 
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3.  Minimum Core Obligations 
In 1990, the CESCR established that “a core obligation” of 
immediate effect was to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, the 
“minimum essential levels” of each of the ICESCR rights.80 A State 
Party is prima facie failing to discharge its obligations under the 
ICESCR where a significant number of individuals under its jurisdiction 
are deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of 
basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education.81 
Thus, where cuts are made to social security schemes that impinge on 
the minimum core of these rights, a State Party is prima facie in breach 
of its ICESCR obligations.82 The burden of proof then lies with the state 
to demonstrate that it has done everything possible to make full use of 
all available resources to satisfy these minimum obligations as a matter 
of priority.83 In the context of austerity, the CESCR has argued that any 
policy change or adjustment should identify the minimum core content 
of rights, or a social protection floor, as developed by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), and ensure the protection of this core 
content at all times.84  
4.  Non-discrimination and Equality 
The ICESCR requires that State Parties ensure that protection of 
the rights contained within it is without discrimination of any kind.85 
Non-discrimination is an immediate obligation that requires not merely 
the proscription of arbitrary differentiation between groups but also the 
promotion of substantive equality in the enjoyment of rights.86 This 
obligation requires, inter alia, that states ensure the satisfaction of 
socioeconomic rights is available and affordable for all, and that poorer 
households are not disproportionately burdened with expenses.87 In 
relation to austerity measures, states must demonstrate that they have 
taken all possible measures, including tax measures, to support social 
                                                                                                     
 80. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 55, ¶ 10. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment 19: The Right to 
Social Security, supra note 62, ¶ 59(a). 
 83. See id. ¶ 60. 
 84. See Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., supra note 64.  
 85. See ICESCR, supra note 43, arts. 2(2), 3. 
 86. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 20: Non-
Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶¶ 7–9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 
(May 25, 2009) [hereinafter CESCR, General Comment No. 20].  
 87. See, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62, ¶ 27; CESCR, General 
Comment No. 14, supra note 62, ¶ 12(b). 
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transfers and mitigate the inequalities that can grow in times of crisis.88 
This may require states to adopt progressive tax structures89 and avoid 
regressive sales taxes or value-added taxes that may be incompatible 
with these principles given the disproportionate impact they have on 
those already experiencing financial difficulties.90 
State Parties are also under an obligation to attenuate laws, 
policies, and practices that are indirectly discriminatory: facially neutral 
measures which have a disproportionate impact on certain groups’ 
enjoyment of socioeconomic rights.91 This is a particularly critical 
obligation during times of economic and financial crisis, as austerity 
measures have been documented to have significant and 
disproportionate negative impacts on disadvantaged and marginalized 
individuals and groups. Particularly affected groups include the poor, 
women, children, persons with disabilities, older persons, persons with 
HIV/AIDS, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, migrants, refugees, 
and the unemployed.92 
5.  Obligations to Respect, Protect, and Fulfil 
The CESCR have also used General Comments to advance a 
tripartite typology of state obligations.93 This imposes three “types” or 
“levels” of obligations on state parties: to respect, protect, and fulfil.94 
The duty to respect requires that states refrain from interfering with 
                                                                                                     
 88. See Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 64. 
 89. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Food, ¶ 87(e), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/33/Add.4, annex (Jan. 26, 2010) (by 
Olivier De Schutter). See generally Obenland, supra note 73 (examining how tax policy in 
Germany affects human rights); Saiz, supra note 71 (discussing how tax structures can be 
adjusted to support human rights principles).  
 90. Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, supra 
note 61, ¶ 50; Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Human Rts., supra note 74, at 9–
10. 
 91. CESCR, General Comment No. 20, supra note 82, ¶ 10(b). 
 92. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rep. of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. E/2013/82 (May 7, 2013). 
 93. See generally Henry Shue, Rights in the Light of Duties, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 65 (Peter G. Brown & Douglas MacLean eds., 1979) (arguing that 
human rights impose three core duties on States: the duty to avoid depriving, the duty to 
protect from deprivation and the duty to aid the deprived); Asbjørn Eide, Economic, Social 
And Cultural Rights As Human Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A 
TEXTBOOK 21 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that that human rights obligations 
can be classified into three categories: the State’s obligations to respect, protect and fulfil). 
 94. E.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 12: The Right to 
Adequate Food, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999); CESCR, General Comment 
No. 13, supra note 62, ¶ 46; CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supra note 62, ¶ 33; 
CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62, ¶ 20. 
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the enjoyment of a right.95 The duty to protect requires the adoption of 
measures to ensure that third parties do not interfere with the 
socioeconomic rights of individuals and collectives under the State 
Party’s jurisdiction.96 Given the increasing tendency to privatize public 
services under conditions of austerity, the duty to protect will at least 
require that the state regulate and monitor private service providers to 
ensure that the objects of socioeconomic rights remain affordable, 
accessible, adequate, and are provided in a non-discriminatory 
manner.97  
The duty to fulfil requires states to take positive measures to assist 
individuals and communities to enjoy their rights. Such measures are 
particularly important in the context of economic crisis, where high 
unemployment and rising costs of living can push individuals and 
communities further into poverty. Measures that should be adopted to 
ensure essential goods are affordable include appropriate low-cost 
techniques and technologies; appropriate pricing policies (for instance, 
free or low-cost access to goods such as water and services such as 
healthcare); and income supplementation.98 Where individuals are 
unable to realize rights for themselves for reasons beyond their 
control—for example, having been made redundant—states are obliged 
to guarantee the right directly.99  
II.  CONTINGENT LIMITATIONS OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS FOR 
CHALLENGING AUSTERITY 
In Part I, we argued that the international law of socioeconomic 
rights contains a number of principles that can be mobilized to contest 
neoliberal austerity measures. Nevertheless, while socioeconomic rights 
discourse contains a number of potentially counterhegemonic frames, 
there are also a number of limitations to the discourse. Part II will 
address two of the contingent limitations, which we define as 
shortcomings in socioeconomic rights law as currently constituted that 
undermine its effectiveness in challenging austerity measures. We shall 
look in turn at the failure of human rights standards to adequately 
                                                                                                     
 95. Asbjørn Eide, Realization of Social and Economic Rights: The Minimum Threshold 
Approach, 43 INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS REV. 40, 40–41 (1989). 
 96. See CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supra note 62, ¶ 33 (preventing parties from 
interfering with the article 12 guarantees to the right to health). 
 97. E.g., id. ¶ 42; CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62, ¶¶ 22, 23; CESCR, 
General Comment No. 16, supra note 60, ¶¶ 45, 46; see also Manisuli Ssenyonjo, The 
Applicability of International Human Rights Law to Non-State Actors: What Relevance to 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights?, 12 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 725, 725–26 (2008). 
 98. Cf. CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62, ¶ 27. 
 99. See id. ¶ 25. 
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address the responsibilities of transnational actors, and then at 
ambiguity in the interpretation of the “non-retrogression” doctrine.  
A.  Human Rights Standards Fail to Adequately Address the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Actors 
Some critics have questioned the adequacy of traditional, 
territorially bounded conceptions of human rights obligations for 
addressing the types of violations of socioeconomic rights associated 
with neoliberal globalization.100 The traditional human rights paradigm 
imposes obligations on states to respect, protect, and fulfill the human 
rights of those subjects within their territorial jurisdiction. However, 
the capacity of states to regulate certain aspects of economic and social 
affairs within their own borders has been significantly weakened by 
developments in the financial and commodity markets, the consolidation 
of global productive capacity by transnational corporations, and the 
economic and ideological leverage of international financial institutions 
(IFIs) like the IMF and World Bank.101 During the 1990s and 2000s, 
much ink was spilled documenting the negative impact on poverty levels 
and income inequality of “structural adjustment programs”102 imposed 
by the IMF and World Bank.103  
Today, IFIs are playing a key role in imposing austerity across 
Europe. The recent sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone triggered joint 
action by the IMF, the European Commission (EC), and the European 
Central Bank (ECB)—often termed the “Troika”—in imposing 
budgetary cuts on heavily indebted European nations such as Ireland, 
Cyprus, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.104 These measures have had 
negative—in the Greek case, catastrophic—consequences for 
socioeconomic rights. A report by the Center for Economic and Social 
                                                                                                     
 100. E.g. MICHAŁ GONDEK, THE REACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBALISING WORLD: 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 291–367 (2009) (explaining 
the extraterritorial application of treaties on economic, social, and cultural rights). 
 101. LESLIE SKLAIR, GLOBALIZATION: CAPITALISM & ITS ALTERNATIVES 309 (3d ed. 2002). 
 102. These were officially reclassified as “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers” after 
1999, but they remained fundamentally the same in substance. See Frances Stewart & 
Michael Wang, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Within the Human Rights Perspective, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS A MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 447, 447–48 
(Philip Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005). 
 103. See STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PARTICIPATORY REVIEW INT'L NETWORK, THE POLICY 
ROOTS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POVERTY: A MULTI-COUNTRY PARTICIPATORY 
ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 173–74 (2002); M. RODWAN ABOUHARB & 
DAVID CINGRANELLI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 135–49 (2007). 
 104. See Martin McKee et al., Austerity: A Failed Experiment on the People of Europe, 12 
CLINICAL MED. 346, 346 (2012). 
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Rights concluded that measures adopted by Ireland that were 
negotiated by the Troika had “severely reduced enjoyment of a range of 
economic and social rights.”105 In his End of Mission Statement to 
Greece, the U.N. Independent Expert on Foreign Debt and Human 
Rights concluded that the imposition of austerity on Greece had 
imposed significant social costs on the Greek people, including high 
unemployment, homelessness, poverty, and inequality, as well as 
setbacks in the rights to work, social security, health care, and 
housing.106 In relation to the far-reaching welfare reforms introduced in 
Greece, Manos Matsaganis has noted that, “[w]ith no exceptions, 
reforms were forced on reluctant governments . . . and on a (at best) 
suspicious public from above, by the Troika.”107 
Advocates of socioeconomic rights have argued that the traditional, 
territorially bounded and state-centric model of human rights 
enforcement creates an “accountability gap” whereby transnational 
actors whose actions have an enormous impact on the protection and 
promotion of human rights are nevertheless not directly bound by any 
human rights obligations. Margot Salomon illustrates the nature of this 
accountability gap through an examination of the European Union’s 
(EU) response to the Greek sovereign debt crisis.108 The Troika 
established a European Stability Mechanism (ESM) through which 
consecutive loan agreements have been provided to Greece.109 Continued 
support has been conditional on reductions in public spending, drastic 
labor market reform, and retrenchment of the welfare state—policies 
that have brought extreme poverty and hardship on the Greek people.110  
                                                                                                     
 105. CTR. FOR ECON. & SOC. RIGHTS, MAULED BY THE CELTIC TIGER: HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
IRELAND’S ECONOMIC MELTDOWN 24 (2012), http://www.cesr.org/downloads/cesr.ireland. 
briefing.12.02.2012.pdf. 
 106. United Nations Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other 
Related International Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human 
Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Mr. Cephas Lumina Mission to 
Greece, 22-26 April 2013: End of Mission Statement, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFFICE 
OF THE HIGHER COMM'R (April 26, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13272&LangID=E. 
 107. MANOS MATSAGANIS, THE GREEK CRISIS: SOCIAL IMPACT AND POLICY RESPONSES 26 
(2013), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/10314.pdf. 
 108. See Margot Salomon, Austerity, Human Rights and Europe’s Accountability Gap, 
OPEN DEMOCRACY (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights-
blog/margot-salomon/austerity-human-rights-and-europe%E2%80%99s-accountability-gap 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
 109. ESM Programme for Greece, EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM, http://www.esm. 
europa.eu/assistance/Greece/index.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2016). 
 110. Stuckler and Basu’s harrowing account documents the return of HIV and malaria 
epidemics to Greece as a result of “health service reforms” required by the Troika. See 
STUCKLER & BASU, supra note 10, at 77–94.  
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Greece’s imposition of these austerity conditionalities led to a 
finding by the Council of Europe’s European Committee of Social Rights 
that Greece had violated the right to social security under the European 
Social Charter (ESC).111 Yet, as Salomon notes, the IFIs that imposed 
these austerity conditions upon Greece were able to avoid any human 
rights accountability for their actions because the ESC only binds 
ratifying states and not international organizations.112 Furthermore, the 
ESM was constituted as a separate international organization rather 
than as an EU agency, which means that the ESM Member States are 
not applying EU law and thus are not bound by the socioeconomic rights 
guarantees contained in the EU Charter.113 The upshot is that human 
rights claims can only be bought against “enfeebled governments” but 
not the transnational actors that enforce “disciplinary neoliberalism” on 
them.114  
Two proposed reforms to dominant understandings of human rights 
obligations are put forward to plug this gap. The first argues that 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, as legal personalities 
under international law, are directly bound to at least respect the rights 
contained within the ICESCR in their operations.115 Whatever the 
correctness of this legal argument is, it should be noted that 
representatives of these institutions have staunchly resisted any 
imposition of binding human rights standards.116 The second line of 
                                                                                                     
 111. See Fed’n of Employed Pensioners of Greece (IKA-ETAM) v. Greece, 57 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. (ser. 2) 34, 49–50 (2012). 
 112. Margot E. Salomon, Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions, 21 
EUR. L. J. 521, 528–31 (2015); see also Aoife Nolan, Addressing Economic and Social 
Rights Violations by Non-state Actors Through the Role of the State: A Comparison of 
Regional Approaches to the “Obligation to Protect”, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 225, 226–30 (2009) 
(surveying regional human rights bodies' practices regarding State responsibility for 
violations of economic and social rights by non-state actors). 
 113. See Salomon, supra note 108, at 532–37. Socioeconomic rights are contained within 
Chapter IV of the Charter. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ch. 
IV, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 15–17. 
 114. “Disciplinary Neoliberalism” is the term Stephen Gill uses to describe the role 
played by transnational structures to expand the scope and increase the power of market-
based structures and forces so that governments and other economic agents are 
disciplined by market mechanisms. See Stephen Gill, Globalisation, Market Civilisation, 
and Disciplinary Neoliberalism, 24 MILLENNIUM J. INT'L STUD. 399, 399–400 (1995). 
 115. See, e.g., SIGRUN I SKOGLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK 
AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 125–36 (2001); JEAN ZIEGLER ET AL., THE FIGHT 
FOR THE RIGHT TO FOOD: LESSONS LEARNED 84–90 (2010). 
 116. See, e.g., IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTOR PANEL: IN PRACTICE 
241 (2d ed. 2000) (“There is no legal obligation on the part of the Bank or its staff to 
guarantee that the project it finances will succeed or will not cause any harm to any 
party.”); Willem van Genugten, The World Bank Group, the IMF and Human Rights: 
About Direct Obligations and the Attribution of Unlawful Conduct, in CHALLENGING 
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argument is that the individual states that make up organizations such 
as the World Bank and IMF should be held accountable for the 
“extraterritorial” violations of human rights that they cause or 
contribute to by their conduct vis-à-vis these organizations, particularly 
the rich states that wield disproportionate power and influence within 
them.117 There is some textual support for this argument within the 
ICESCR, as well as the jurisprudence of the CESCR.  
In respect of the ICESCR, two points can be made. First, the 
ICESCR, unlike the majority of international human rights treaties, 
makes no explicit mention of the scope of its territorial application.118 
Whereas Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights imposes obligations on State Parties to respect and 
ensure the rights of all individuals “within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction,” there is no mention of territory or jurisdiction in the 
wording of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR.119 Second, there is an explicit 
reference within Article 2(1) of the ICESCR to international assistance 
and cooperation as a means to achieve the full realization of the rights 
provided by the covenant. This reference to international assistance and 
cooperation is reiterated in several other articles.120  
Furthermore, the CESCR has established in its General Comments 
that State Parties to the ICESCR have a number of international 
obligations. From General Comment No. 14 onwards, the CESCR has 
consistently used mandatory language to express the international 
obligations of states to respect and protect the enjoyment of ICESCR 
rights of people in third countries (“have to”), while obligations to fulfill 
                                                                                                     
TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A PLURAL AND DIVERSE 
DUTY-BEARER REGIME 44, 45–47 (Wouter Vandenhole ed., 2015); FRANÇOIS GIANVITI, 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY FUND paras. 
10-30 (2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/gianv3.pdf (arguing 
that the ICESCR does not apply to the IMF). 
 117. See, e.g., Smita Narula, International Financial Institutions, Transnational 
Corporations and Duties of States, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE 
EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 114, 115–16 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2012); Radhika 
Balakrishnan & James Heintz, Extraterritorial Obligations, Financial Globalisation and 
Macroeconomic Governance, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 146, 147–52 (Aoife Nolan ed., 2014). 
 118. On the implications of not mentioning the scope of ICESCR’s territorial 
applications, see MARGOT E. SALOMON, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
WORLD POVERTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 75–77 (2007). 
 119. Compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(1), supra note 
44, with International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2(1), supra 
note 43. 
 120. See ICESCR, arts. 11(2), 15(4), 22, 23, supra note 43. 
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have been expressed in recommendatory language (“should”).121 For 
example, in relation to the right to health, the CESCR has held that: 
To comply with their international obligations in 
relation to article 12, States parties have to respect the 
enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and 
to prevent third parties from violating the right in other 
countries, if they are able to influence these third parties 
by way of legal or political means, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and applicable 
international law. Depending on the availability of 
resources, States should facilitate access to essential 
health facilities, goods and services in other countries, 
wherever possible and provide the necessary aid when 
required.122 
This robust language would indicate that Member States acting 
within IFIs such the IMF and World Bank have mandatory obligations 
to respect and protect socioeconomic rights, such that they may not 
formulate loan conditionalities or other lending policies that will 
negatively impact the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights in the recipient 
country. At a minimum, this might require IFIs to engage in some basic 
consultation on the projected socioeconomic effects of their policies.123 
Unfortunately however, whenever the CESCR expressly mentions the 
obligations of States Parties as Member States of IFIs, it qualifies the 
nature of their extraterritorial obligations in recommendatory language 
(“should”):  
Accordingly, States parties which are members of 
international financial institutions, notably the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 
regional development banks, should pay greater 
attention to the protection of the right to health in 
                                                                                                     
 121. E.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62, ¶¶ 31, 36; see also id. ¶¶ 
20–29 (discussing the taxonomy duties to respect, protect, and fulfill). 
 122. CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supra note 62, ¶ 39 (emphasis added). 
 123. See Salomon, supra note 108, at 530 (discussing how consultation was sometimes 
omitted or prevented from taking place). 
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influencing the lending policies, credit agreements and 
international measures of these institutions.124  
This is a particularly weakly worded obligation. First, it is non-
mandatory (“should”); second, it is ambiguously relativized (“greater”—
but in relation to what?); and third, its terms could be satisfied in an 
entirely tokenistic way. For example, greater attention could be paid to 
the right to health in lending policies and then simply be ignored in 
policy formulation. This is an extremely important point, as the policy 
design of conditional loans can have severe adverse impacts on a 
country’s capacity to ensure socioeconomic rights.125 As Stuckler and 
Basu show in their harrowing account, the “health service reforms” and 
budget cuts imposed on Greece by the Troika have had disastrous 
consequences on the nation’s health, including helping to foster the 
return of HIV and malaria epidemics.126 Such dire health indicators in 
any European nation would have been scarcely imaginable a few years 
ago. 
The jurisprudence of the CESCR is therefore ambiguous in terms of 
the strength of the obligations of States Parties within IFIs. This is 
most unfortunate in light of the considerable influence, evident in the 
Greek case, that IFI activity has on States Parties’ abilities to comply 
with their obligations under international socioeconomic rights 
instruments. It is hoped that, with the maturation of the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR, a more detailed and concretized jurisprudence 
with regard to extraterritorial application of socioeconomic rights will be 
developed through periodic reporting procedures, individual complaints, 
and inquiry procedures.127 This path, however, is likely to be a slow one. 
To date128 there are only twenty-one parties to the Optional Protocol 
and, as Eide Riedel, member of the CESCR from 1997 to 2012, has 
argued,  
                                                                                                     
 124. CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supra note 62, ¶ 39 (emphasis added); see also 
CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62, ¶¶ 31, 235; CESCR, General Comment 
No. 19, supra note 62, ¶¶ 53, 58. 
 125. In her account of conditionality in the Greek case, Salomon notes the highly 
prescriptive nature of the Troika conditions including, for example, a requirement to 
“[e]liminate pension bonuses.” Salomon, supra note 108, at 528–29. 
 126. See STUCKLER & BASU, supra note 10, at 77, 87. See generally RICK ROWDEN, THE 
DEADLY IDEAS OF NEOLIBERALISM: HOW THE IMF HAS UNDERMINED PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
THE FIGHT AGAINST AIDS (2009) (discussing the interplay between neoliberal economics 
and the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases related to poverty). 
 127. See generally Ashfaq Khalfan, Accountability Mechanisms, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, 
STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 117, at 391 (discussing the ways in which 
IESCR could compel nations to comply with socioeconomic rights regulations). 
 128. Dec. 9, 2015. 
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[T]he Committee should take great care not to overstep 
its role once the Optional Protocol [comes into] force . . . . 
It would be wise to choose micro-level issues first and 
keep away from macro-issues such as extraterritorial 
application of [the] ICESCR . . . . This would definitely 
frighten off many states from ratifying.129  
In the interim period, the CESCR could adopt a new, more detailed 
General Comment addressing the question of the extraterritorial scope 
of socioeconomic rights, building on recent scholarly work in the area, 
especially pertaining to questions of jurisdiction, causation, and division 
of responsibility.130  
B.  Ambiguity of the Concept of “Non-retrogression” 
As outlined above, a major component of the ICESCR obligation to 
“progressively realize” socioeconomic rights is the obligation to avoid 
reductions in the protection of these rights. Given the propensity of 
austerity programs to reduce enjoyment of socioeconomic rights,131 the 
duty of non-retrogression has clear potential to limit the damage done. 
A strong version of non-retrogression can “lock in” rights protection and 
counter the logic of austerity.132 The core of this duty of non-
retrogression is a presumption against backwards steps or “backsliding” 
in the protection of rights.133 States wishing to enact such a 
                                                                                                     
 129. ILIAS BANTEKAS & LUTZ OETTE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 
217 (2013). 
 130. See generally Olivier De Schutter et al., Commentary to the Maastricht Principles 
on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 1084 (2012) (commenting on the key themes, strengths, and 
weaknesses of the Maastricht Principles); GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE 
EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 117 (examining the state of international law on 
extraterritorial obligations in the context of economic, social, and cultural rights). 
 131. See generally James Harrison & Mary-Ann Stephenson, Assessing the Impact of the 
Public Spending Cuts: Taking Human Rights and Equality Seriously, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND PUBLIC FINANCE: BUDGETS AND THE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
219 (Aoife Nolan et al. eds., 2013) (surveying various austerity measures nations have 
undertaken and how such measures affect the nations' respective citizens). 
 132. See Aoife Nolan et al., Two Steps Forward, No Steps Back? Evolving Criteria on the 
Prohibition of Retrogression in Economic and Social Rights, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 121, 128–29 (Aoife Nolan ed., 2014). See 
generally Joe Wills, The World Turned Upside Down? Neo-Liberalism, Socioeconomic 
Rights, and Hegemony, 27 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 11 (2014) (discussing the ways in which 
austerity must temporarily and proportionately affect a nation to preserve human rights).  
 133. See Jill Cottrell & Yash Ghai, The Role of the Courts in the Protection of Economic, 
Social & Cultural Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: THE 
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retrogressive measure have the burden of proving that the measure is 
justified according to criteria set down by the CESCR.134 Yet the criteria 
against which states are tested have been subject to frequent change. 
The resulting lack of clarity, and the CESCR’s weak examination of the 
obligation, has caused the principle of non-retrogression to be of limited 
effect in challenging austerity measures.135 
In various statements the CESCR has outlined multiple versions of 
the criteria that it will use in testing for a retrogressive measure. From 
a modest starting point in 1991, the CESCR’s doctrine of non-
retrogression developed into a more fully textured obligation in the 
period from 1999 to 2007.136 Although the committee originally only 
required states to justify retrogressive measures by reference to the 
“totality of rights” and to use the maximum of available resources in 
order to avoid a finding of an impermissible retrogressive measure,137 
the list of criteria later expanded. By November 2007, the CESCR had 
developed some seven factors that would purportedly be examined: 
whether there was a “reasonable justification” for the measure; whether 
the State had examined alternative measures; whether the measure had 
been justified by reference to other ICESCR rights; whether there had 
been participation of affected groups in devising the policy; whether the 
measures were in any way discriminatory; whether there would be a 
sustained or unreasonable impact resulting from the measure; and 
whether there had been independent review of the measure.138 
However, this relatively comprehensive framework was subject to 
significant revisions in 2012 when the chairperson of the CESCR 
released a letter addressing the financial and economic crises.139 That 
letter purported to substantially alter the test for a retrogressive 
measure.140 The committee noted that, to avoid enacting a retrogressive 
measure, states’ measures should be temporary, necessary, 
proportionate, non-discriminatory, and must not infringe the minimum 
core of the right.141 This is a clear weakening of earlier standards. Such 
an alteration of the standards of scrutiny is particularly concerning 
                                                                                                     
ROLE OF JUDGES IN IMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS 58, 61 (Yash 
Ghai & Jill Cottrell eds., 2004); see also Nolan et al., supra note 132, at 123. 
 134. See, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 13, supra note 62, ¶ 45. 
 135. See Nolan et al., supra note 132, at 140. 
 136. This began with the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See 
CESCR, General Comment No. 13, supra note 62, ¶ 45. 
 137. See CESCR, General Comment No. 3, supra note 57, ¶ 9. 
 138. See CESCR, General Comment No. 19, supra note 62, ¶ 42. 
 139. See Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 64. 
 140. See Ben TC Warwick, Socio-Economic Rights During Economic Crises: A Changed 
Approach to Non-Retrogression, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 249, 257 (2016). 
 141. See Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 64. 
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given the context of wide-reaching austerity programs and raises the 
question of why a period of retrenchment for socioeconomic rights was 
seen as the appropriate juncture for such changes. 
While there remains a need for greater conceptual clarity around 
non-retrogression142 and, in particular, a reversal of the weak position 
taken in the 2012 letter, a balance must be struck between change and 
stability. It is likely that the regular variation of the doctrine of non-
retrogression over the past fifteen years has contributed somewhat to its 
weak enforcement in the CESCR’s examinations of State Parties. Only 
infrequently has the CESCR addressed the issue of retrogression in its 
Concluding Observations on state compliance.143 On these occasions the 
committee has been tentative about finding a violation of the obligation, 
opting instead to remind states of their obligations.144 Stability in the 
terms of the doctrine is likely to be beneficial in addressing this 
enforcement gap. With the progress of states being examined 
approximately every five years,145 having a constantly shifting set of 
criteria for such a key general obligation lends little certainty to the 
CESCR or to states about the scope of non-retrogression, or the 
standard against which examinations are made. 
The choice to modify the doctrine of non-retrogression in the midst 
of a wave of austerity programs meant, in concrete terms, that the 
CESCR’s changes were introduced in the same biannual session of the 
                                                                                                     
 142. See Nolan et al., supra note 132, at 121–22. 
 143. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the 
Combined Fourth and Fifth Reports of Bulgaria, Adopted by the Committee at its Forty-
Ninth Session, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/BGR/CO/R.4–5 (Nov. 30, 2012) [hereinafter CESCR, 
Bulgaria]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: New Zealand, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/NZL/CO/3 (May 31, 2012); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Germany, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/DEU/CO/5 (May 20, 2011); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Concluding 
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Chile, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.105 (Dec. 1, 2004); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rts., Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Mauritius, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/8 (May 31, 1994) [hereinafter CESCR, Mauritius]; 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Hungary, ¶ 152, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1992/2 (1992). 
 144. This is especially the case in recent years. Compare CESCR, Mauritius, supra note 
143 (admonishing directly “the re-introduction of fees at the tertiary level of education, 
which constitutes a deliberately retrogressive step”), with CESCR, Bulgaria, supra note 
143 (reminding States to “avoi[d] any retrogressive step with regard to the protection of 
workers’ labor rights.”). 
 145. WOUTER VANDENHOLE, THE PROCEEDURES BEFORE THE UN TREATY BODIES: 
DIVERGENCE OR CONVERGENCE? 126 (2004). 
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committee that saw the examination of the significant and high-profile 
austerity measures of the Spanish state.146 The timing of this change 
limited the committee to doing little more than “draw[ing] the State 
party’s attention” to its modified standards on non-retrogression.147  
It is also a matter of concern that analysis of retrogression is largely 
absent from the ICESCR reporting guidelines.148 These guidelines 
request information on key aspects of a state’s performance of their 
socioeconomic rights obligations. However, at present, states are not 
required to submit information, justifications, or explanation on any 
backwards steps that have been enacted in the period under 
examination.149 Such an omission reduces the CESCR’s ability to 
systematically hold states accountable and prevents the committee from 
subjecting socioeconomic-rights-reducing policies to a full examination. 
In the context of widespread austerity programs, where there are more 
frequent occurrences of backwards steps, there is even greater value to 
such information being provided.  
Furthermore, this information must be appropriately circumscribed 
in order to be of use to the CESCR in its monitoring. Examples abound 
of national situations for which there are more general statistical 
indicators which raise issues of concern, but for which the specific 
information needed in order to demonstrate retrogression is limited. 
Thus there is much awareness, for instance, of the fact that health 
services in Ireland were subject to significant budget cuts at a time 
when need for the services was on the increase.150 Yet the doctrine of 
non-retrogression does not extend to preventing “economic 
constraints,”151 but rather relies on showing some specific deterioration 
of rights standards. This necessitates a more focused statistical account 
of the enjoyment of some aspect of the right to health during the period 
of austerity. 
                                                                                                     
 146. In fact, the Letter containing the guidance was released on May 16, 2012—eight 
days after Spain had been examined by the Committee.  
 147. See CESCR, Spain, supra note 64. 
 148. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Guidelines On Treaty-Specific 
Documents To Be Submitted By States Parties Under Articles 16 And 17 Of The 
International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc E/C.12/2008/2 
(Mar. 24, 2009). 
 149. See id. 
 150. See ANNE NOLAN ET AL., EUR. OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH SYSTEMS & POLICIES, THE 
IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTH IN IRELAND 1 (2014); 
CTR. FOR ECON. & SOC. RIGHTS, supra note 105, at 5. 
 151. This point is taken to its height in Mary Dowell-Jones, The Economics of the 
Austerity Crisis: Unpicking Some Human Rights Arguments, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 
197 (2015). 
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While demanding greater information on retrogressive policies and 
ensuring a degree of doctrinal stability are important to ensuring a 
more robust response to harmful backwards steps brought about by 
austerity, the system of state reporting described here is a sluggish and 
fundamentally retrospective exercise. States report to the CESCR 
around every five years, and, although there is a degree of chance 
inherent in when during a period of austerity this examination falls,152 
such a length of time is significant when compared to the rapidity of 
some austerity programs. The time period between state examinations 
is sufficient to allow an austerity program to “take hold,” and, even 
following a finding of retrogression by the CESCR, such delays might 
make reversal of enacted and embedded policies more difficult. 
Two other methods besides cyclical state examinations offer greater 
responsiveness in challenging austerity measures on the basis of 
socioeconomic rights. The first is the individual-complaint mechanism, 
recently in force, which allows individuals to bring a “case” against a 
state which has ratified the terms of the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR.153 Although currently only twenty-one states have ratified the 
protocol,154 as the number of ratifications grows, the number of 
complaints is also likely to grow.155 Strategic litigation offers the 
potential for impermissible retrogressive measures to be identified by 
the CESCR much sooner after their enactment, and for the impacts of 
austerity on socioeconomic rights to be addressed more quickly. The 
second method, which might allow for more timely interventions, 
requires the CESCR to provide further examples of, and greater detail 
on, the kinds of measures that it will find to be retrogressive. Currently, 
the only clear example given relates to the right to work.156 By providing 
further points of comparison in General Comments, Concluding 
                                                                                                     
 152. For example, by chance Spain fell to be examined relatively soon after it began its 
austerity program (austerity underway 2011; examined 2012), whereas Ireland (austerity 
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 153. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
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Observations, and in its Optional Protocol jurisprudence, the CESCR 
would aid rights advocates working in national settings to make well-
founded cases against proposed retrogressive measures. Such actions 
are crucially important in addressing potential socioeconomic rights 
violations ex ante, before harms have resulted.  
III.  STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS FOR 
CHALLENGING AUSTERITY 
In Part II, we discussed two contingent limitations of appeals to 
socioeconomic rights law. Such limitations could conceivably be 
overcome through the clarification of existing standards (better and 
more consistent definition of the meaning of non-retrogression) or 
extending their reach (to include transnational actors). There are, 
however, a number of structural features of socioeconomic rights law 
which limit its ability to challenge austerity and are trickier to 
surmount. These are the more fundamental presuppositions and axioms 
that frame socioeconomic rights law which ignore and naturalize the 
factors and forces that drive the current austerity measures. We call 
these structural limitations. 
The limitations of legal human rights discourse have been well 
documented in critical legal theory. Human rights are argued to be too 
narrow and legalistic as a discourse to be used to challenge the 
systematic and material bases for social deprivation that are governed 
by the systemic logic and organization of the global political economy.157 
Such arguments are concerned that rights discourse channels 
oppositional movements into technical legal disputes around peripheral 
questions and diverts attention away from the need for meaningful 
social and political transformations.158 Human rights challenges, 
particularly in the form of litigation, often revolve around relatively 
narrow issues, while underlying structural factors (political, social, 
cultural, and economic) are generally left unaddressed.159 It is true that 
in recent years, a number of human rights scholars have been 
developing tools and models to apply socioeconomic rights standards 
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more broadly to fiscal policy.160 While undoubtedly a step forward and a 
valuable contribution to expanding the lens of socioeconomic rights 
analysis, these models can only address distributive patterns and state 
policies, but not the underlying forces and factors that drive those 
patterns and policies. 
What are the underlying structural factors associated with the 
current austerity drive? Robin Blackburn argues that the current 
financial crisis is the culmination of a number of trends strongly 
promoted by neoliberal globalization: “extreme inequality, poverty, 
financial deregulation, privatization and a pervasive commodification of 
the life course, via mortgages, credit-card debt, student fees and private 
pensions.”161 Rising inequality both within and between countries led to 
low wages in emerging economies and growing indebtedness and 
extreme concentration of wealth in established economies, which, taken 
in conjunction with the deregulation of financial markets, allowed 
investment banks and hedge funds, heedless of the consequences, to 
pursue short-term advantage through expanded credit schemes.162 This 
in turn generated the succession of asset bubbles that created the 
current crisis. Marxist political economists like David Harvey have 
argued financial crises like the current one are an inherent and 
recurrent feature in the workings of the capitalist system.163 Legal 
socioeconomic rights discourse is ill-suited to addressing these 
structural dynamics; it may address certain symptoms, but it has little 
to say about root causes. A failure to fully diagnose a problem inevitably 
means that the prescriptions will be limited or ephemeral.  
Legal socioeconomic rights discourse is also limited in its perception 
of power dynamics. In human rights analysis, the identification of a 
violator, violation, and remedy is foregrounded, while broader relations 
and structures of power are bracketed or minimized.164 Susan Marks 
has suggested that the identification of human rights violators can often 
obscure the question of who the beneficiaries of such violations are.165 As 
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Thomas Pogge has argued, material deprivation is not natural or 
inevitable but rather something that is happening as the result of a 
particular “global institutional order designed for the benefit of the 
affluent countries’ governments and corporations, and of the poor 
countries’ military and political elites.”166 Denials of basic socioeconomic 
rights are not “accidents” nor are they “random in distribution and 
effect.”167 Rather they are, as Paul Farmer has put it, “symptoms of 
deeper pathologies of power and are linked intimately to the social 
conditions that so often determine who will suffer abuse and who will be 
shielded from harm.”168 It is no coincidence that Western governments 
responded to their economic crises by providing liquidity for the 
financial elites while cutting services that the poor and vulnerable rely 
upon. Nor is it a coincidence that  
[A]t the very same time we see millions of people pushed 
further into penury through conscious state policy (with 
all the right-denying effects that this has), we also see 
the number of wealthy people around the world steadily 
increasing, as well as governments introducing 
“business friendly” tax regimes . . . . [Austerity] now 
provides a pretext for a more brutal and extensive 
application of the inegalitarian logics inherent within 
neoliberal capitalism.169  
In other words, neoliberalism functions, as David Harvey argues, to 
serve “the interests of private property owners, businesses, 
multinational corporations, and financial capital.”170 An atomizing focus 
on violations and remedies alone cannot identify these patterned logics, 
nor can it prescribe meaningful long term solutions to them. 
In one sense, this observation is not new. Indeed, the U.N. human 
rights system is expressly premised on the understanding that the legal 
and political are entirely distinct categories, and it is the function of its 
human rights bodies to clarify, monitor, and enforce the content of 
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international legal norms while remaining neutral on questions of a 
political nature.171 This is the position of the CESCR, which insists that  
in terms of political and economic systems the Covenant 
is neutral and its principles cannot accurately be 
described as being predicated exclusively upon the need 
for, or the desirability of a socialist or a capitalist 
system, or a mixed, centrally planned, or laisser-faire 
economy, or upon any other particular approach.172 
However, the broader point to be made here is that casting legal 
doctrine as politically neutral is “at best a sleight of hand,” for it is 
“precisely in acting as though law were neutral that legal discourse 
operates ideologically, not merely masking social inequalities but 
making those inequalities appear the inevitable concomitant to a 
neutral and impartial legal order.”173 We can see the operation of this 
“sleight of hand” in the jurisprudence of the CESCR, which, despite its 
insistence of political neutrality, ends up embracing a variant of 
neoliberalism that has been termed the “Post-Washington Consensus” 
(PWC).174  
The CESCR has, in the face of overwhelming evidence, expressed 
concern about and criticism of the impact of adjustment measures and 
austerity on socioeconomic rights on numerous occasions.175 
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Nevertheless it also recognizes “that adjustment programmes will often 
be unavoidable and that these will frequently involve a major element of 
austerity.”176 The CESCR does not regard austerity to be necessarily 
incompatible with the realization of socioeconomic rights.177 Rather, it 
has argued that such measures must be compensated for by approaches 
which enhance the compatibility of those trends and policies with full 
respect for socioeconomic rights.178 In response to the current wave of 
austerity measures, the chairperson of the CESCR has acknowledged 
“the pressure on many States Parties to embark on austerity 
programmes . . . in the face of rising public deficit and poor economic 
growth” and notes further that “the Committee is acutely aware that 
this may lead many States to take decisions with sometimes painful 
effects.”179 While some retrogression in the enjoyment of socioeconomic 
rights is “inevitable,” it must be compatible with state obligations under 
the ICESCR.180 In short, the CESCR supports “adjustment with a 
human face.”181  
To make these observations is not necessarily to criticize the 
CESCR; given the limits of their mandate within the state-centric U.N. 
human rights system, the most pragmatic path for them to take may be 
to adopt a stance that scrutinizes austerity measures and holds 
governments accountable for the ways in which they implement it when 
they do. Indeed, in Part I.B above, we argued that the CESCR have 
developed a number of principles that are useful for doing just that. 
However, the stance adopted by the CESCR does indicate the limits of 
international socioeconomic rights law: not only does it not allow for 
broad political critique of these policy trends, it may also contribute to 
normalizing and naturalizing austerity measures by describing them as 
“unavoidable” and “inevitable.” This is the general paradox of “political 
neutrality”: failing to take a stance in relation to a dominant political 
trend can be to politically acquiesce to that trend. 
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Austerity is neither natural nor “inevitable”: it is the product of a 
particular political-economic order and the conscious political choice of 
governments and intergovernmental organizations. Legal socioeconomic 
rights norms can serve as a useful standard to measure and critique the 
adverse human impact of these policies. But they can only go so far. As 
Robin Blackburn, talking about human rights more generally, so 
eloquently put it,  
 “Human rights” can serve as a valuable watchword and 
measure. But because inequality and injustice are 
structural, constituted by multiple intersecting planes of 
capitalist accumulation and realization, more needs to 
be said—especially in relation to financial and corporate 
power and how these might be curbed and socialized. 
The plight of billions can be represented as a lack of 
effective rights, but it is the “property question”—the 
fact that the world is owned by a tiny elite of 
expropriators—that is constitutive of that plight. The 
slogan of rights takes us some way along the path; but it 
alone cannot pose the property question relevant to the 
21st century.182 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that many of the principles underscoring 
international socioeconomic rights law can serve as useful discursive 
tools for contesting neoliberal driven austerity measures. The principles 
of progressive realization, non-retrogression, maximum available 
resource mobilization, non-discrimination, equality, minimum core 
duties, participation, and accountability were argued to constitute 
important counterframes to the neoliberal fixation on economic growth, 
efficiency, and competitiveness. However, the paper also argued that 
there are a number of limitations to appeals to socioeconomic rights 
discourse to challenge austerity, most notability its inability to address 
the structural forces that drive these policy choices or to articulate the 
radical forms of transformation that will be needed to overcome them. 
These identified shortcomings should not, however, form the basis 
for the rejection of socioeconomic rights discourse altogether. They 
should rather be the impetus for a “two-track” approach to 
socioeconomic rights. The first track is tactical: this involves mobilizing 
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and reforming current discourses of socioeconomic rights so as to make 
them better vehicles for contesting neoliberal policy measures. This will 
require, amongst other things, clarifying the principle of non-
retrogression, and seeking to apply socioeconomic rights standards to 
transnational actors (if not in law then at least in political discourse). 
The second track is strategic: this consists of linking socioeconomic 
rights discourses to counterhegemonic political discourses that 
articulate attempts to move beyond the neoliberal logic of austerity.183 
The recent emergence of anti-austerity movements such as the Coalition 
of the Radical Left (“Syriza”) in Greece, Podemos in Spain, a socialist 
coalition government in Portugal, a revived social democratic Labour 
Party in the United Kingdom, and the Scottish National Party in 
Scotland, as well as a variety of grassroots and popular movements 
across Europe, shows that a continent-wide movement against austerity 
is growing.184 Socioeconomic rights advocates should work with 
grassroots campaigns and political movements against austerity, 
identifying intersections between these groups’ demands and the 
principles established in socioeconomic rights law.  
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